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New Regulations for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research: Their Significance for the Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities (1987)

New Regulations for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research: Their Significance for the Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities (1987)

©1987, 2013 by Dallas Denny

Source. Dallas Denny. (1987). New Regulations for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research: Their Significance for the Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities. Paper for qualifying examinations, George Peabody College of Vanderbilt University.

 

 

 

New Regulations For The Treatment Of Animals In Behavioral Research

Their Significance For The Treatment Of Individuals With Disabilities 

By Dallas Denny

For General Qualifying Examinations, Department of Special Education

George Peabody College of Vanderbilt University

April 21, 1987

 

Abstract

Within the past decade it has again become legitimate for behavioral scientists to speculate about the mental processes of animals. Concurrent with this has been a resurgence of concern about humane treatment of animals in behavioral experimentation. Activities by animal activists have helped to cause new Federal regulations for the treatment of non-human animals in behavioral research. Additionally, both the American Psychological Association and the Animal Behavior Society have issued new guidelines for the ethical treatment of animals. The new regulations and guidelines cast new light on the way humans, and especially humans with disabilities, are treated. Increased exchange of ideas between those interested in the treatment of human animals and those interested in the treatment of non-human animals is needed.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the popular and biological literature abounded with anecdotal reports of the mental abilities and “intelligent” behavior of many non-human animals. Infrahumans, especially mammals, were often shamelessly anthropomorphized and imbued with intent, planning ability, wisdom, and Victorian morals (cf Seton, 1907). However, by the 1930’s, behavioral scientists in the United States were careful to avoid anthropomorphism or attributing any sort of mental activity to infrahumans. This was due to a number of factors, including Watson’s (1913, 1919) formulation of the classic behavioral position, the experimental work of Thorndike (1911) and Pavlov (1927), and the misinterpretation and overinterpretation of C. Lloyd Morgan’s “Canon”, (i.e., “that the behavior of an animal must not be interpreted as the outcome of higher mental processes if it can be interpreted in terms of lower mental processes” (1894, p. 24).

During the past decade it has again become legitimate for behavioral scientists to talk about the mental activities of non-human animals (Burghardt, 1978; Burghardt & Herzog, 1980; Griffin, 1976, 1978, 1984). This change of attitude was gradual, stemming in part from the field and observational studies of the European ethologists, such as Von Frisch’s (1967) work on symbolic communication in honeybees, and in part from work done by American psychologists, especially studies of symbolic communication and self-recognition in primates (eg Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Gallup, 1977; & Rumbaugh, 1985).

Concurrent with renewed interest in the mental abilities of infrahumans, there has been new interest in their rights, especially as subjects in behavioral research. A number of organizations have formed for the purpose of advocating for the rights of non-human animals. Some of these organizations take a moderate stance (cf The Animal Welfare Institute Quarterly, 31(1). However, other factions of the animal rights movement are militant. Recent activities of animal rights advocates have led to increased public awareness of the living conditions and treatment of nonhuman animals used in behavioral research (cf Landers, 1986). This is serious business. The Head Trauma Center at the University of Pennsylvania lost its funding after members of the Animal Liberation Front raided the center, freed the research animals, confiscated film and videotapes, and showed them to U.S. Congressmen (Holden, 1986).

Behavioral scientists have landed on both sides of the animal rights issue. On the one hand, C.R. Galllstel (1981) and Neal Miller (1985) have pointed out that the use of infrahumans in behavioral research has led to important breakthroughs in basic and applied science. Miller (1985) has stated that reducing human suffering justifies almost anything we can do to nonhuman animals. Others have suggested that the matter needs study. For example, Burghardt and Herzog have called for the creation of an ethological ethics “divorced from the self-erving apologetics and ad hominem counterattacks so often typical of agribusiness, drug, and cosmetic companies” (1980, p. 767).

This increased awareness of animal rights has resulted in new Federal regulations for the use of animals in behavioral research (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture & 185 Farm Bill]. In addition, both the American Psychological Association and the Animal Behavior Society have recently formulated guidelines for the ethical treatment of animals used in behavioral research. These guidelines and regulations specify standards for housing and cleanliness, veterinary care, experimental procedures, and disposal of unwanted animals. Unlike previous regulations and guidelines, they take into account both the physical and psychological needs of non-human animals.

The regulations for treatment of nonhuman animals can and should be used to cast new light on our treatment of human animals, and especially individuals with disabilities. Findings might be surprising. For example, in recent years there has been considerable controversy regarding “Baby Doe” cases in which a disabled infant is allowed to expire from want of food and water. This has been ethically justified by classifying food and water as “treatments” and then withholding treatment (Lusthaus, 1985). Such a procedure would be both unethical and illegal under current guidelines and regulations for the treatment of animals. Certainly, a closer examination and comparison of the rights of human and non-human animals is warranted.

Current and future thinking about the treatment of animals will have an impact on the treatment of individuals with disabilities. Scientists concerned with treatment of human animals and scientists concerned with the treatment of non-human animals should exchange information and ideas informally, in symposia, and in the pages of professional journals. Perhaps from such an exchange, an ethics of animal (human and non-human) rights will emerge.

References

 

Animal Welfare Institute Quarterly, 31(1). Animal Welfare Institute. P.O. Box 3650, Washington, D.C.20007.

Burghardt, G.M. (1978). Closing the circle: The ethology of mind. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, pp. 562-563.

Burghardt, G.M.; & Herzog, H.A., Jr. (1980). Beyond conspecifics: Is Brer Rabbit our brother? Bioscience, 30(11), pp. 763-768.

Gallistel, C.R. (1981). Bell, Magendie, and the proposals to restrict the use of animals in neurobehavioral research. American Psychologist, 36(4), pp. 357-360.

Gallup, G.G. (1977). Self-recognition in primates. American Psychologist, 32, pp. 329-338.

Gardner, B.T.; & Gardner, R.A. (1969). Teaching sign language to a chimpanzee. Science, 165, pp. 664-672.

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Griffin, D.R. (1984). Animal thinking. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.

Holden, C. (1986). A pivotal year for lab animal welfare. Science, 232, pp. 147-150.

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Landers, S. (1986). NIH moves 15 monkeys. APA Monitor, September, pp. 6-7.

Lusthaus, E.W. (1985). Involuntary euthanasia and current attempts to define persons with mental retardation as less than human. Mental Retardation, 23(3), pp. 148-154.

Miller, N. (1985). The value of behavioral research on animals. American Psychologist, 40(5), pp. 423-440.

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Rumbaugh, D.; & Savage-Rumbaugh, 8. (1985). The human/animal contact. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Animal Behavior Society, Raleigh, NC, June 24-28.

Seton, E.T. (1907). The natural history of the ten commandments. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

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Von Frisch, K. (1967). The dance language and orientation of bees. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.

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Watson, J.B. (1919). Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist. Philadelphia: Lippincott.